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Note from the Field
Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil
Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening
in Kenya
Christine Bjorkt & Juanita Goebertustt
This Note examines the nexus between international and domestic
criminal justice systems. It discusses whether the International Criminal
Court (1CC) can advance positive complementarity through its so-called
preliminary examinations. Using Kenya as a case study, we analyze the
advocacy strategies of Kenyan NGOs during the preliminary
examination that took place between February 2008 and March 2010.
We found that Kenyan NGOs did not use the ICC preliminary
examination to "trigger" criminal justice reform or domestic
accountability for crimes perpetrated during the post-election violence.
Instead, these NGOs successfully focused on advocating for the ICC
preliminary examination to turn into a formal investigation. Kenya's
experience with the ICC preliminary examination leads us to conclude
that positive complementarity poses a paradox for NGOs: if they insist on
capacity-building of the domestic justice system, they fail at
demonstrating that the State is "unwilling or unable" to prosecute crimes
domestically. This Note explores that paradox.
t Christine Bjork is a Desk Officer at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for
International Law, Human Rights and Treaty Law, in Stockholm. She has LL.M. degrees from
Harvard Law School and Stockholm University.
tt Juanita Goebertus Estrada is the Special Assistant to the National Security Advisor of
Colombia. She is a lawyer and political scientist from the Universidad de los Andes, and has
an LL.M. degree from Harvard Law School where she attended as a Fulbright Scholar. She has
conducted extensive research on issues such as rule of law, state-building, transitional justice,
political economy of conflicts, human rights, and international humanitarian law.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Kenya reinstated multi-party politics in 1991, the country has
experienced violence before and during elections.' By the end of 2007, yet
another election crisis had materialized in Kenya. Disputed presidential
election results triggered protests and violence reinforced by ethnic
tensions. This time, however, the violence was more widespread; it was
urban as well as rural, affecting a majority of the Kenyan provinces, and
was more deadly and destructive than ever before. Ultimately, 1,133
people were killed, many more injured, and thousands of private and
public properties were burned, pillaged, or destroyed, causing massive
internal displacement. 2
The 2007-2008 post-election violence did not emerge out of a vacuum.
While the pre-election violence was mainly a clash between supporters of
different candidates in response to the perceived rigging of elections, the
post-election violence had a distinct ethnic dimension.3  In previous
elections, Kenyan politicians have used ethnic division to fuel political
support for their own ethnic groups.4 There is a widespread and common
belief that Kenyan presidents favor their own ethnic groups.5 The growth
of presidential power and the lack of checks and balances on the
government have led to the conviction that one's own group must be in
power in order to have access to resources, especially land.6 The pattern of
unprosecuted election violence has contributed to a culture of impunity,
which, together with poverty and unemployment, has led youths to be
willing to take up arms as "mercenaries" on behalf of anyone who will pay
them.7 All of these tensions came to the surface during the 2007 election.
One Luo woman described her experience during the post-election violence
in Mombasa by stating that "it was as if we ceased to be human for a
moment." 8
In February 2008, President Mwai Kibaki and the opposition leader
Raila Odinga signed a power-sharing agreement, which ended the violence
and stopped Kenya from plunging into civil war. However, Kenya's
coalition government has been averse to holding perpetrators of the post-
1. REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE vii (Oct.
15, 2008) [hereinafter Waki Report], http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/
PEV%20Report.pdf (last visited May 2,2010).
2. Id. at 383.
3. id. at 115.
4. ANNOTATED AGENDA AND TIMETABLE FOR THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND
RECONCILIATION (2008), http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/S.of-P-withMatrix.pdf (last
visited May 2, 2010).
5. See, e.g., Joel D. Barkan, Kenya After Moi, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 87 (outlining the characteristics
of Kenyan politics and the impact of ethnicity).
6. Id.
7. Interview with youth-group leader at the screening of a documentary, in Huruma (Mar.
16, 2010). Interview sources in this Note are kept anonymous in order to protect their integrity
and to honor the confidentiality with which the interviews were given.
8. Interview with employee at anonymous org. no. 7, in Nairobi (Mar. 17, 2010).
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election violence accountable now that both sides are sharing power. The
Waki Commission, an independent task force set up to investigate the post-
election violence, concluded that while the pre-election violence was a
spontaneous combustion between supporters of different election
candidates, the post-election violence was to a large extent organized and
planned by politicians and businessmen.9 The Waki Commission also
found that the perpetrators were not just ordinary citizens but also
members of the State Security Agencies.10
The serious deficiencies of the Kenyan criminal justice system are an
undeniable reality, openly recognized even by governmental authorities."
Some of the main problems include: (i) insufficient investigative capabilities
and resources on the part of the police; (ii) corruption within the police
force; (iii) lack of oversight by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG)
and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) over the Crime Investigations
Department (CID) of the police; (iv) political interference with and
manipulation of the work of the police, the OAG, and the judicial chambers;
and (v) lack of a disciplinary system for the police and the judiciary.12
So far, the Attorney General has initiated very few investigations and
prosecutions of crimes perpetrated during the post-election violence.13
There have been no prosecutions of those suspected of orchestrating the
violence - that is, those who would bear the most responsibility. The
difficulties in dealing with the main perpetrators through the ordinary
justice system are evident: if the system is so deficient that it cannot convict
even the low-level perpetrators, how will it take on high-level politicians
with significant influence over the justice system? While there have been
attempts to establish a transitional justice mechanism in the form of a
Special Tribunal to deal specifically with the post-election violence, the
Parliament has struck down or stalled several bills proposing to install such
a Tribunal.14
The ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo started monitoring the
situation in Kenya in February 2008. Under Article 15 of the Rome Statute,
the Prosecutor can initiate so-called "preliminary examinations" wherein he
proactively monitors and analyzes information on alleged crimes under the
9. Waki Report, supra note 1, at 346-47.
10. Id. at 348.
11. Interview with Mutula Kilonzo, Minister of Justice, National Cohesion and
Constitutional Affairs, in Nairobi (Mar. 16, 2010).
12. Id.; Interview with Philip Murgor, former Director of Public Prosecutions, in Nairobi
(Mar. 18, 2010); Interview with Hassan Omar, Commissioner of the Kenya National
Commission on Human Rights, in Nairobi (Mar. 16, 2010); Waki Report, supra note 1, at 28-29,
364, 394-96, 405-07, 410-11, 420, 430-32, 438, 445-55; Barkan, supra note 5, at 97.
13. Interview with anonymous org. no. 5, in Nairobi (Mar. 16, 2010); Waki Report, supra
note 1, at 420 (there are no official statistics of the number of prosecutions pertaining to the
post-election violence, and the reported numbers vary between five and nineteen).
14. See, e.g., Kenya: Deliver Justice for Victims of Post-Election Violence, HUMAN RIGHTIS
WATCH (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/08/02/kenya-deliver-justice-
victims-post-election-violence; Kenya's Bill for Bloodshed Nears Payment, N.Y. TIMES (July 15,
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/world/africa/16kenya.htm.
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Statute. Thus far, the Prosecutor has made a number of preliminary
examinations public, including, among others, Afghanistan, Colombia,
COte d'Ivoire, Gaza, Georgia, Guinea, and Kenya. The purpose of the
preliminary examination is to determine whether the Prosecutor should ask
for authorization from the Pre-trial Chamber to open an investigation in
accordance with statutory requirements.15
One of the purposes of making the preliminary examinations public -
which is a relatively recent policy development initiated by Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo16 - is to notify States of potential ICC investigation and
encourage them to take action themselves.' 7 The anticipated reaction from
a State under ICC scrutiny is that it will "aggressively and fairly pursue
domestic prosecutions of international crimes so as not to trigger the
jurisdiction of the ICC over the case and invite the glare of the eyes of the
international community upon it."s Ideally, ICC preliminary examinations
should therefore "trigger" domestic prosecution of international crimes, for
instance through installment of transitional justice mechanisms or domestic
criminal justice reforms, either complementing the Court's limited
prosecutions of the top level perpetrators or negating the need for formal
investigation and prosecution at the ICC altogether. This is often referred
to as "positive complementarity" and it is one of the core principles in the
current Prosecutor's strategy. 19  While the notion of positive
complementarity was hardly contemplated during the drafting of the Rome
Statute, the concept has evolved rapidly in recent years, and the idea that
the ICC can have a positive impact on the functioning of domestic justice
15. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF
THE PROSECUTOR (2003) [hereinafter POLICY ISSUES], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf.
16. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, DRAFT POLICY PAPER ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS
(2010) available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/E278F5A2-A4F9-43D7-83D2-
6A2C9CF5D7D7/282515/OTPDraftpolicypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04l0l.pdf.
17. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012 10 (2009)
[hereinafter PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-
D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf.
18. Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implications for Domestic Law and
National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 215,223 (2003).
19. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 4 (2006)
[hereinafter PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY REPORT], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D673DD8C-D427-4547-BC69-
2D363EO7274B/143708/ProsecutorialStrategy2006O9l4_English.pdf); see also BUREAU OF THE
ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES, REPORT OF THE HAGUE WORKING GROUP ON COMPLEMENTARITY,
1 16 (2010) (defining positive complementarity as "all activities/actions whereby national
jurisdictions are strengthened and enabled to conduct genuine national investigations and
trials of crimes included in the Rome Statute, without involving the Court in capacity building,
financial support and technical assistance, but instead leaving these actions and activities for
States, to assist each other on a voluntary basis."). For a general discussion of the positive
complementarity approach, see W. W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International
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systems has come to be both widespread and influential. 20
In Kenya, however, the ICC preliminary examination did not appear to
encourage Kenyan authorities to take action. Since there were no serious
attempts to investigate or prosecute perpetrators of the post-election
violence by the deadline agreed upon by the Prosecutor and Kenyan
authorities, the Prosecutor found reasonable basis to proceed with an ICC
investigation.21 This is the first time the Prosecutor has invoked the power
to open a proprio motu investigation conferred to him under Article 15 of the
Rome Statute.22 On March 31, 2010, Pre-trial Chamber II authorized the
Prosecutor to commence a formal investigation covering alleged crimes
against humanity committed during the post-election violence, and on
December 15, 2010, the Prosecutor presented cases against six individuals.
Requests for the issuance of summonses to appear were made for William
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang, Francis Kirimi
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and Mohamed Hussein Ali. 23 All held
prominent positions in the Kenyan public and private spheres at the time of
the post-election violence. Three were serving as Ministers in the Kenyan
Cabinet, and the others included the Commissioner of the Kenyan Police,
the Chairman of the National Security Advisory Committee and a radio
broadcaster.24 The Prosecutor believes that these six people were the main
orchestrators of the post-election violence.25
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This unique and complex situation - involving massive violence, a
20. One practical example is the EU Action Plan on the ICC, recently renewed by a
decision by the European Council and with a purpose of guiding the EU and its Member
States in their activities and initiatives relating to the ICC. The Action Plan suggests that "the
EU and its Member States should support training programs and such other initiatives as may
be necessary for fostering the professionalism of national judges, prosecutors, officials, other
staff or experts needed for the effective functioning of the ICC complementarity system." COUNCIL
DECISION, 2011 O.J. L 76/56 168 (Mar. 21, 2011) (emphasis added), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:076:0056:0058:EN:PDF.
21. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Prosecution's Response to
Decision Requesting Clarifiation and Additional Information at B (Mar. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/95262FO3-3528-43B8-B2C9-E6DEA165C659.htm.
22. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Request for Authorization of an
Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc785972.pdf.
23. Press Release, ICC, Kenya's Post-election Violence: ICC Prosecutor Presents Cases
Against Six Individuals for Crimes Against Humanity (Dec. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/BA2041D8-3F304531-8850-431B5B2F4416.htm.
24. Id.
25. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Prosecutor's Application
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and
Mohammed Hussein Ali, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc985621.pdf;
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. LCC-01/09, Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to
Article 58 as to William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, and Joshua Arap Sang, available
at http://www.ice-cpi.int/icedocs/doc/doc985613.pdf.
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dysfunctional criminal justice system, the ICC, and a vibrant civil society -
moved us to visit Kenya in March 2010. Our objective was to identify
whether national NGOs were taking advantage of the ICC attention to push
for national criminal justice system reform in Kenya and, consequently,
whether the ICC preliminary examination was triggering domestic
accountability for the post-election violence in Kenya.
In essence, this research was inspired by two main questions: what can
and should the ICC do to promote or facilitate an increased functioning of
domestic justice systems? What role can domestic civil society play in such
a process? In order to answer these questions we undertook qualitative
research in Kenya, a country that at the time was under preliminary
examination by the ICC. The process, content, and scope of that research
will be described infra. However, before exploring the findings from our
research in Kenya, we will first situate the discussion within the normative
and theoretical framework that guides our analysis.
A. The Principle of Complementarity
The ICC is equipped with complementary jurisdiction, a legal concept
that has become gradually more relevant for the emerging system of global
justice with cooperation over national boundaries. To ensure criminal
accountability of those who have committed the core crimes over which the
ICC has jurisdiction, the States Parties at the Rome conference tailored the
Court's jurisdiction so that it both entitles and obliges states to investigate
crimes within their own jurisdiction. 26 According to the rules in the Rome
Statute that govern the admissibility of cases before the Court, the ICC can
only assert jurisdiction if a State is "unwilling or unable" genuinely to carry
out the investigation or prosecution of a case.27 The individual states have a
primary right and responsibility to investigate and prosecute, and the ICC
can only assert jurisdiction if national courts do not fulfill their
obligations.28 As a permanent international mechanism of justice, the ICC
is meant only to complement, not supersede, national jurisdiction, and the
principle of complementarity is the procedural safeguard that ensures that
the Court does not limit the sovereign rights of the States Parties. The rules
governing the admissibility of cases before the ICC thus reveal a preference
for domestic rather than international justice.
Commentators have further argued that domestic justice is more likely
to promote reconciliation within an affected community, establish
26. See JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATuTE AND NATIONAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 235-308 (2008); JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: THE PRINCIPLE OF
COMPLEMENTARITY 17 (2008).
27. Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. The
specific conditions for the ICC to be able to assert jurisdiction are detailed in several other
articles of the Statute.
28. STIGEN, supra note 26, at 5.
210 [Vol. 14
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permanent justice mechanisms capable of preventing the society from
falling back into conflict, and offer a more pertinent sense of justice to
victims. 29 This is not only relevant to the issue of domestic versus
international justice mechanisms. A broader literature on rule of law
reform and development policy has signaled the importance of avoiding
one-size-fits-all solutions, instead encouraging bottom-up approaches that
can guarantee better results both in terms of effectiveness of the legal
institutions implemented, and in terms of their legitimacy and potential for
reconciliation.30
Moreover, given the ICC's resource constraints and its policy of
prosecuting only those who bear the greatest responsibility for the most
serious crimes, the Court is only able to prosecute a small fraction of cases
in any situation.31 As a result, domestic proceedings must commence in
order to prosecute a majority of international crime perpetrators. This
reality is reflected in the fact that the Prosecutor will indict only six
individuals for the widespread and extensive violence that took place
around the latest election in Kenya, leaving the majority of the perpetrators
unpunished unless prosecuted domestically.
While the argument that domestic justice is always superior to
international justice is both hypothetical and speculative, the normative
underpinning of the principle of complementarity, as well as the Court's
resource constraints, lead to the conclusion that, whenever possible,
domestic prosecutions should either supersede or complement the ICC's
jurisdiction over international crimes. Several people have expressed the
hope that the ICC's complementary function can serve as a catalyst through
which States Parties are induced to comply with their obligation to
investigate and prosecute ICC crimes.32 On that note, the ICC Prosecutor
29. Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A
Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 212 (2006); See also MARIEKE
WIERDA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, Briefing, Stocktaking: Complernentarity 3 (2010),
available at http://www.ictj.org/static/publications/ICTJRSR6-complementarity-bp2OlO.pdf
(concluding that "in situ trials - that is, trials taking place in the territory where the crimes
were committed - should be considered for their demonstration effect"); Brady Hall, Using
Hybrid Tribunals as Trivias: Furthering the Goals of Post-Conflict Justice While Transferring Cases
from the ICTY to Serbia's Domestic War Crimes Tribunal, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 39, 61 (2005)
(arguing that international tribunals are justified, but that when possible, domestic institutions
- or at least hybrid tribunals - must take over in order to facilitate reconciliation); Donna Arzt,
Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal Tribunals in the Former
Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 226, 227 (2006) (concluding
that if international tribunals are to achieve their aims, the local population's perception of
their legitimacy is a crucial factor).
30. See DAVID M. TRUBEK & ALVARO SANTOS, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (2006).
31. See POLICY ISSUES, supra note 15; see also PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY REPORT, supra note
19.
32. KLEFFNER, supra note 26, at 3, 309; James A. Goldston, Exec. Dir., Open Society Justice
Initiative, Remarks at the United Nations Rule of Law Panel Discussion, Strengthening the
Nexus Between International Criminal Justice and National Capacity to Combat Impunity (Apr. 9,
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Luis Moreno-Ocampo has emphasized that the success of the ICC will be
judged not by its number of prosecutions, but by the number of
international prosecutions avoided because of the increased functioning of
domestic legal systems.33
If the ICC's preliminary examinations can actually serve as a catalyst
through which States Parties are induced to comply with their obligation to
investigate and prosecute international crimes, then complementarity has
wider implications than those of a mere procedural principle governing the
admissibility of cases before the Court.34 Under this understanding, the
ICC is not merely a tool with which the international community pursues
prosecutions of the main criminal perpetrators who would otherwise
escape accountability, but also a potentially important mechanism for
strengthening the rule of law around the globe by contributing to increased
functioning of domestic criminal justice systems.35
B. The Rule of Law
The ICC Chief Prosecutor has stated that one of the objectives of his
office is to encourage and facilitate states in investigating and prosecuting
crimes domestically.36 The emerging focus on positive complementarity
was also evident during the June 2010 ICC Review Conference in Kampala,
Uganda, where the practical implications of the principle of
complementarity were at the center of the review. 37  Since then,
commentators have suggested that the ICC should be more involved in
strengthening domestic institutions and that the division of labor between
the Court and national jurisdictions can be constructed through a positive
complementarity mechanism, for instance one similar to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's "transition team," which
shared information with domestic courts when cases were referred back to
national systems.38
33. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Statement at the Ceremony for the
Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 2 (June 16,
2003) [hereinafter Prosecutor's Initial Statement], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdordyres/D7572226-264A-4B6B-85E3-
2673648B4896/143585/030616_moreno ocampo english.pdf.
34. KLEFFNER, supra note 26, at 216; Prosecutor's Initial Statement, supra note 33, at 2;
PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012, supra note 17, 1 17.
35. Open Society Justice Institute, Statement to the Ninth Session of the Assembly of States
Parties, New York, Promoting Complementarity in Practice: Lessons from Three ICC Situation
Countries 2 (Dec. 7, 2010) available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/
intemational-justice/articles-publications/ publications/complementarity-in-practice-
20110119/complementarity-case-studies-20101210.pdf (concluding that complementarity and
the rule of law are related).
36. POLIcY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 5.
37. See ICC, REPORT OF THE BUREAU ON STOCKTAKING: COMPLEMENTARITY, TAKING STOCK
OF THE PRINcIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY: BRIDGING TI-I IMPUNITY UAP ICC-ASP/8/51 (2010)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE BUREAU ON STOCKTAKING].
38. WIEiRDA, supra note 29, at 3 (concluding that the ICC primarily has a judicial mandate
and its ability to contribute to domestic capacity-building will remain limited); see also Morten
212 [Vol. 14
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Despite the current focus on the implications of positive
complementarity, the Prosecutor maintains that the ICC can only contribute
indirectly by encouraging states to take action themselves. As he pointed
out during the UN Consultative Conference on International Criminal
Justice, "complementarity is not about training judges, we passing
information, we building capacity [sic]. No, complementarity is what the
others are doing."39 The reality is that the ICC does not have an explicit
objective to actively participate in rule of law strengthening; not only does
the Court lack an express mandate to carry out the functions of a
development agency, but the States Parties are unlikely to finance such
direct interventions. 40 Moreover, as a number of critics of the rule of law
discipline have pointed out, attempting to strengthen the rule of law from
abroad is a recipe for failure, and, therefore, having the ICC participate
directly in rule of law strengthening would most likely be counter-
productive. What then can the ICC do to promote positive
complementarity without getting involved in domestic affairs? This section
contends that it should primarily defer to domestic public and private
actors to tailor their own rule of law strengthening programs.
Throughout the twentieth century, development agencies prescribed
"strengthening of the rule of law" as an elixir for economic development
and democracy.41 More recently, however, the idea that the rule of law can
be "built" and that such a process can have direct results in terms of
development and democracy has been questioned; many scholars have
explored the limitations of attempting to transplant the rule of law to an
apparent lawless or "failed" state.42 They have concluded that rule of law
strengthening from abroad, with the perspective of an "international
expert," is not only ineffective, but has serious limitations in terms of
legitimacy.
The main recommendation advanced by the rule of law discipline is
that although the focus on institutional capacity is important, legitimacy of
Bergsmo, Olympia Bekou & Annika Jones, Complementarity After Kampala: Capacity Building and
the ICC's Legal Tools, 2 GOTTINGEN J. INT'L L. 791, 793 (2010) (noting that the term positive
complementarity, which had originally been used to refer to the ICC's role in the construction
of national capacity, was used throughout the Review Conference to refer to the involvement
of States, international organizations, and civil society in strengthening justice at the national
level).
39. Consultative Conference on International Criminal Justice, United Nations
Headquarters (Sept. 9-11, 2009), available at http://www.internationalcriminaljustice.net.
40. See REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF STOCKTAKING, supra note 37.
41. See, e.g., Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" Promise, in THE NEW
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., 2006). For the theories that supported the policies promoted by those agencies, see,
e.g., A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188 (1959); FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SELFDOM 80-96 (1944); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 17 (1999); MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOuIETY (1968); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtues, 93 LAW Q. REv. 195
(1977).
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formal and informal institutions are key aspects in rule of law
strengthening. Legitimacy emerges not from legal reforms, but through
bottom-up, grassroots work. As Jorge Esquirol suggests, there is much
more to building the rule of law than reforming the national criminal justice
system: "'[t]he image of rule of law can be seen as the product of a
combination of factors, inter alia: significant political consensus, strenuous
law enforcement, ample informational resources, parallel social norms, and
a dedicated class of legal scholars claiming that it is so." 43 Domestic actors,
such as NGOs, are generally better equipped than the ICC - an
international justice mechanism located far from the places in which it
operates and staffed primarily by foreigners - to contribute to these
complex and intertwined processes of strengthening the rule of law.
Local practices and community arrangements have proven to be
extremely important to assure compliance with the law and a culture of
legality. For instance, though training police officers, reforming the rules
that determine the procedure to appoint judges, and creating a new
disciplinary court for the judiciary are important features to strengthen the
rule of law in Kenya, these measures are meaningless if such institutions
are not legitimate. If the public does not trust these institutions, it is less
likely that law compliance will increase.
Additionally, many rule of law strengthening programs fail to unveil
the political contestations that underscore their work. As Laure-H6lene
Piron points out, we still "need to learn to go beyond 'technical' solutions
and understand the political context for intended reforms."44 This is
especially true in Kenya, where justice-sector reforms attempting to
increase the impartiality of the judiciary and the police pose a huge political
threat to the executive branch, which currently has significant influence
over these institutions. 45
Thus, when the ICC Prosecutor suggests that strengthening the rule of
law is less about the ICC training judges and criminal investigators than
about what the people on the ground are doing to strengthen their own rule
of law, his statement can be seen as embedded in the critique of the rule of
law movement. By not determining the content of the rule of law, avoiding
transplanting foreign legal institutions, and deferring to local actors to
design and implement legal institutions, the ICC, in practice, has responded
to a long tradition of critique of international development programs. This
approach, however, leaves local actors with the important task of
advocating for and implementing domestic criminal justice reforms in
States that are unwilling or unable to hold perpetrators of international
crimes accountable. When States are unwilling to fulfill their obligations
under the Rome Statute, the primary local actor that can push the State to
43. Jorge Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 87 (2008).
44. Laure-H614ne Piron, Time to Learn, Time to Act in Africa, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
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implement reforms is civil society, for instance in the form of NGOs
advocating for and tailoring justice reform programs.
In the case of Kenya, NGOs have historically been known for their
capacity to enable political and institutional reform.46 However, their
particular role in the contemporary strive for domestic accountability for
the post-election violence - and their ability to utilize the pressure exerted
by the ICC to advance the necessary reforms - requires further analysis.
The following section will address this issue.
II. FINDINGS
We visited Kenya in March 2010. At the time, we were both LL.M.
candidates at Harvard Law School with specific interests in criminal justice,
law and development, and justice sector reform. The objective of our
research was to identify whether Kenyan NGOs were taking advantage of
the ICC preliminary examination to push for national criminal justice
system reforms and, consequently, whether the ICC preliminary
examination in Kenya could potentially trigger domestic accountability for
the post-election violence. Our fieldwork allowed us to make connections
between three crucial issues that are often viewed in isolation: the role of
the ICC and its relationship to rule of law strengthening, the rule of law as
more than national criminal justice system reform, and the role of civil
society and NGOs in institutional capacity-building.
On site in Nairobi, we undertook qualitative research based on in-
depth, open-ended interviews with eight civil society organizations: one
state-sponsored human rights commission (the Kenya National
Commission on Human Rights), three local NGOs (InformAction, the
Movement for Political Accountability, and the Kenya Human Rights
Commission), and four international NGOs staffed mainly with Kenyan
professionals (the International Commission of Jurists, the International
Center for Transitional Justice, the Open Society Institute for Eastern Africa,
and the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development). We
assembled this sample of NGOs with the intention of covering a wide array
of organizations with different structures and agendas, taking into account
the various approaches to justice reform and ICC intervention in Kenya.
We will recapitulate the statements of the people we interviewed from each
organization without revealing their identity, thereby honoring the
confidentiality with which the statements were given, and insuring the
integrity of our sources. 47
46. Matilda Lasseko, The Role of Civil Society in Transitional Justice Process: The Evolving
Kenyan Experience 195, 196, in JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT, ADDRESSING IMPUNITY AND OPTIONS
FOR JUSTICE IN KENYA: MECHANISMS, ISSUES AND DEBATES (Waruguru Kaguongo & Godfrey M.
Musila eds., 2009) [hereinafter JUDICIARY WATCH REP'ORT].
47. Each organization was coded with a number to identify its statements, e.g.,
"anonymous org. no. 1." In each case the source organization has been kept anonymous in
order to protect its integrity and to honor the confidentiality with which information was
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The interviews with NGO representatives were complemented by two
in-depth and open-ended interviews with the Minister of Justice and
former Director of Public Prosecutions, Philip Murgor. Additionally, we
visited Huruma, one of Nairobi's largest slum areas, where we observed
the screening of a documentary about the post-election violence and the
ICC, and the subsequent discussion between the local inhabitants and the
NGO that screened the documentary. Finally, we conducted a field trip to a
camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Naivasha. We recorded our
observations from the site and the general statements of the IDPs, who
were not formally interviewed.
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the methodological
limitations of using a narrow sample of qualitative sources like this one.
First, the findings presented in this paper are not representative of the work
of all civil society organizations in Kenya, nor of their diverse agendas.
Second, while this paper explores the relationship between ICC preliminary
examinations and the increased functioning of domestic criminal justice
systems, we do not attempt to make broad causal claims. This paper
intends to reflect particular schemes of interaction between the ICC,
domestic NGOs, and government officials in Kenya.
Our fieldwork allowed us to map the agendas of a number of NGOs in
Kenya, particularly taking into account their positions vis-a-vis ICC
intervention and their level of cooperation with the government on justice
reform issues. In general, we were able to conclude that the level of
cooperation between the government and civil society in Kenya is low.
While we found that each NGO has its own dialectic with the State, on
average, local NGOs have limited interaction and partnership with the
State, whereas international NGOs seem to have a higher level of
cooperation.48
One of the local organizations we interviewed, for example, is not
exactly an NGO, but rather a national initiative that uses information and
media to spark action in civil society. Instead of engaging in criminal
justice reform to increase domestic accountability for the post-election
violence, their representatives have decided to work with local
communities to educate people about the ICC's functions and create
consensus about the importance of ICC intervention. Domestic justice
reform programs are not their priority as they have lost hope that any top-
down reforms will be realized. Their preference for ICC intervention over
domestic accountability is a result of their distrust of the Kenyan
government. They aim to contribute to a process of mass critical-reasoning
that allows people to participate in political processes as informed citizens
and elect better leaders. For them, this is the only way to avoid a repetition
given.
48. Compare anonymous local orgs. nos. 5, 6, and 7, and anonymous international orgs.
nos. 1, 2, and 3.
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of massive violence during the next national elections in 2012.49
Similarly, a majority of the other local NGOs have a bottom-up
approach to reforms, several of them promoting a new system for electing
political leaders. One of these NGOs is a domestic grassroots political
group that organizes political rallies, advocates for voting based on issues
rather than on ethnic politics, and supports grassroots political leaders who
are willing to make transparency and accountability pledges. The
organization's activities, therefore, target communities instead of the State.
From a long-term perspective, they might contribute to reforms of the
national criminal justice system by contributing to a new generation of
politicians coming to power who believe in reform and transparency, but,
as the organization points out, it is unlikely that its efforts will be reflected
in the 2012 elections.50
International NGOs, on the other hand, seem to have a more
ambivalent relationship with government institutions. They express the
same distrust that local NGOs do, but they interact somewhat more with
government officials and institutions on various levels. For instance, some
of them are involved in training judges and prosecutors on human rights
issues, which constitutes a form of capacity building of the justice system.
One of the organizations we interviewed is an international NGO dedicated
to the legal protection of human rights in Kenya and the African region.
The fact that this organization both funds other NGOs and conducts its
own advocacy allows it to engage with the government on the one hand
and support critical advocacy on the other.s1
Although all of the NGOs we met with expressed overall support for
ICC intervention, NGOs with limited partnership with the state viewed
ICC intervention as crucial for any kind of justice in Kenya, whereas NGOs
with higher levels of cooperation with the state sought accountability
primarily through the national criminal justice system and the transitional
justice system (i.e. a Special Tribunal or the Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission).
At the time of our visit, a local NGO was screening a documentary that
depicted the post-election violence from the perspective of victims,
emphasizing the fact that all offenders and victims came from different
ethnic groups. It introduced the ICC as the main option to achieve justice
and advanced the idea that without accountability, Kenya was doomed to
repeat the post-election violence in the forthcoming elections. It also
illustrated the lax response by Kenyan authorities, depicting a corrupt and
inaccessible judiciary and a violent police, both incapable and unwilling to
search for justice.
The representative we met from one international NGO dedicated to
promoting accountability and creating just and peaceful societies after
49. Interviews with anonymous org. no. 7, in Nairobi (Mar. 14-15, 2010).
50. Interview with anonymous org. no. 6, in Nairobi (Mar. 17, 2010).
51. Interview with anonymous org. no. 2, in Nairobi (Mar. 18, 2010).
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conflict or mass human rights violations stated that the organization's
official position had originally been that Kenya should create the Special
Tribunal and seek justice, truth, and reparations through national
mechanisms. However, after three failed attempts (one Cabinet refusal and
two rejected parliamentary bills) they came to believe that the only hope for
justice for the victims of the post-election violence was ICC intervention 2
The representative mentioned the executive branch's direct intervention in
judicial matters, a general lack of trust in the judiciary, and the lack of
police investigative capacities as reasons that led them to advocate ICC
intervention rather than the advancement of national proceedings. 53
The same applies to other NGOs that we interviewed, including one
organization dedicated to working with poor and marginalized
communities on issues involving livelihood, conflict, gender equality, and
HIV. The main focus of this organization is gender-driven violence.
Representatives explained that during the two months of post-election
violence, sexual violence was used as "ethnic punishment"; women were
raped and men were forcefully circumcised because of their ethnicity.M
They stated that even though they do not believe that the ICC is the best
solution for bringing justice to Kenya - because it will neither prosecute the
actual perpetrators of sexual violence nor give compensation to the victims
- ICC intervention is still crucial for ending impunity in Kenya. They
emphasized deficiencies in the national criminal justice system and the
stalemate in the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission.55 They
recognized, furthermore, that the ICC preliminary examination has raised
international concern about sexual violence during the post-election
violence, giving unprecedented exposure to these issues and, for the first
time, allowing Kenyans to talk about being victims of sexual violence.
Our research led us to conclude that, in most cases, even the NGOs that
actually had the power to impact national criminal justice system reform
were inclined, instead, to encourage ICC intervention at the time that the
preliminary examination was being conducted.
There are several examples of this tendency. One of the oldest and
most well recognized local NGOs in Kenya was started in the early 1990s
with the mission of working for democratization. It led the movement for
the removal of the ban on opposition parties. Today it has two branches:
one dedicated to monitoring judicial reform and one dedicated to human
rights advocacy. This organization appeared to be more willing than other
domestic NGOs to interact with governmental institutions: its members
lobby the Parliament, participate in human rights training for police
officers, conduct civilian oversight of national proceedings of low-level
perpetrators of the post-election violence, contribute to evidence gathering
52. interview with anonymous org. no. 3, in Nairobi (Mar. 17, 2010).
53. Id.
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in national criminal procedures, present class actions, and litigate to
prosecute perpetrators in national and regional courts. Yet this
organization nonetheless envisioned the ICC as a necessary means to
eradicate political unwillingness to try high- and mid-level perpetrators of
the post-election violence.56 In this sense, their efforts have primarily been
directed at attaining international justice, rather than domestic
accountability.
Other organizations described a similar understanding of the situation
in Kenya. One organization that is particularly influential within Kenyan
civil society is an international NGO that administers grants for other
NGOs and media organizations working on human rights and impunity
issues. They finance report-writing, monitoring, advocacy, witness
coordination, and the taking of victim testimony. One of the more unique
and interesting features of this organization is that it serves as an
"informational bridge" between national and international NGOs,
international organizations, and members of the Kenyan government. They
explained that they use the materials produced by the organizations they
sponsor to criticize and influence policymaking and national and
international opinion.57  The organization has an "under-the-table"
approach, built on its experience and contacts, which allows it to influence
decision-making without compromising their sources or their loyalties.58
Representatives from this organization recognized that they could directly
impact government officials with the power to push for the implementation
of a Special Tribunal. Strikingly, however, they were not utilizing these
channels for fear of deterring or at least delaying the ICC from opening up
a formal investigation in Kenya.59 Even if the criminal justice system were
reformed, justice for the victims of the post-election violence would be
unlikely to be achieved through national mechanisms. This organization
had therefore decided to advocate for ICC intervention instead of pushing
for reform of the national criminal justice system.
In this sense, while several NGOs took advantage of the ICC
preliminary examination to strengthen the rule of law through grassroots
advocacy, not one NGO appeared to have an immediate agenda for
reforming the criminal justice system with the intent of enabling
prosecutions of perpetrators of the post-election violence. 60 The next
section of this Note will address the incentives that disincline Kenyan
NGOs from participating directly in such reforms.
56. Interview with anonymous org. no. 5, in Nairobi (Mar. 16, 2010).
57. Interview with anonymous org. no. 1, in Nairobi (Mar. 17, 2010).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.; interview with anonymous org. no. 3, supra note 52; interview with anonymous
org. no. 5, supra note 56; interview with anonymous org. no. 6, supra note 50; interviews with
anonymous org. no. 7, supra note 8.
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III. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
Studying the role of NGOs in reforming national criminal justice
systems - which by definition is a governmental function - might seem
paradoxical. However, the fact that such organizations are neither financed
nor directed by governments does not mean that their objectives are not
related to broad social and political issues that also concern governments.
It is not strange then, that an international NGO like the International
Commission of Jurists identifies as one of its main objectives "[a]dvanc[ing]
the independence of the judiciary and the legal profession and the
administration of justice in full compliance with standards of international
law." 61
The question, however, is how NGOs can effectively contribute to
strengthening public institutions while remaining outside the political
system. This discussion is part of a wider debate about the relationship
between civil society and the state. The distrust between civil society and
the state is usually grounded in historical circumstances, including massive
human rights abuses, but also in understandings of the governing state
body as independent from the civil society it is supposed to protect. As
Carlos Basombrio suggests, in countries where NGOs can contribute to the
performance of the government without being seen as traitors, there is a
"progressive civil society" that is not afraid of assuming the vocation to
exercise power. 62
In Kenya, NGOs have widely diverse agendas, and attempting to
foresee what their role should be in rule of law strengthening goes beyond
the objectives of this paper. What we can suggest, however, is an analytical
framework for understanding the dialectic between the ICC, civil society,
and rule of law strengthening. Ideally, the ICC's preliminary examinations
should trigger domestic prosecution of international crimes.
Hypothetically, the preliminary examination can aid NGOs working on
overcoming impunity in two distinct ways. First, by extending NGOs the
legitimacy of an international mechanism of justice to advance their claims
for domestic accountability; and second, by providing a "stick" against the
state through the stigma that is associated with ICC intervention. In the
case of Kenya, however, these explanations seem to fall short. This section
will first explore the logic behind "legitimacy" and "stigma," then explore
why those incentives have not translated into NGOs working directly
toward national criminal justice system reform.
61. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTs, Statute, art. 3(2),
http://www.icj.rg/default.asp?nodelD=392&langage=1&myPage=Statute.
62. ACTISTAS E INTELECTUALES DE SOCIEDAD CIVIL EN LA FUNCION POlBLICA EN AMJERICA
LATINA [CIVIL SOCIETY ACrIVISIs AND INTELLEcTUALs IN PUBLIC SERVICE IN LATIN AMERICA] 24-
25 (Carlos Basombrfo Iglesias ed., 2005).
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Identifying the sources of NGOs' legitimacy can aid in analyzing their
motives and why certain causes are incorporated into their agendas while
others are not. A study about the contribution of NGOs to justice reform in
Latin America, for example, concluded that "civil society has not
participated in the changes that have occurred in the justice systems, as the
organizations that represent particular groups with overlapping interests
do not address the topic." 63 The Justice Studies Center of the Americas
explains the lack of civil society impact with the idea that working for the
goals of specific population groups or sectors affords NGOs more
legitimacy than working towards influencing the public agenda.64 In this
sense, both practical challenges and legitimacy issues can restrain civil
society's capacity to participate in institutional reform.
Provided that the ICC is perceived as a legitimate institution,
preliminary examinations can afford NGOs the opportunity to advance
their arguments for particular causes, such as accountability for the high-
level perpetrators that organized the post-election violence, backed by the
extended legitimacy of an international mechanism of justice. When the
arguments and reasoning of an NGO align with those of the ICC, the NGO
receives added rational basis and moral support for its claims, thereby
increasing its legitimacy.
In the case of Kenya, we found that although NGOs have indeed
gained legitimacy from the ICC Prosecutor's preliminary examination, they
have not used it to advocate for domestic accountability or for national
criminal justice reform, but rather to advocate for the effective intervention
of the ICC. Using the position of the international society as proof of the
inadequacies of their current leaders, several NGOs are instead mobilizing
public opinion to oust the political establishment and change the basis on
which politicians are elected. This was evident when we attended the
screening of the documentary Getting Justice: Kenya's Deadly Game of Wait
and See in Huruma. After the screening, people rallied against the political
leaders, shouting, "Send them to The Hague!," thus signaling their
disapproval of the political establishment and agreement with the NGOs'
narrative of events.
B. Stigma
The mere possibility of being branded as "unwilling" or "unable"
should encourage states to initiate reforms and capacity building of the
63. CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE JUSTICIA DE LAS AMlRIcAS [CENTER FOR JUSTICE STUDIES OF THE
AMERICAS], JUSTICIA Y SOCIEDAD CIVIL: EL PAPEL DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL EN LA REFORMA
JUICIAL: ESTUDJIOS DIE CASOS EN ARGENTINA, CILE, COLUMBlA Y PERKU [JUSTICE AND CIVIL
SOCIETY: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN JUSTICE REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF ARGENTINA, CIULE,




Bjork and Goebertus: Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
national criminal justice systems.65 Hypothetically, domestic NGOs should
be able to utilize the preliminary examination as a "stick" to push the state
to initiate these reforms in order to avoid triggering ICC jurisdiction. After
all, a preliminary examination is an unmistakable caution by the ICC: "If
you don't prosecute, we will." In Kenya, however, NGOs seem to have had
difficulties, or have been reluctant, to utilize the "stick" supposedly
provided by the preliminary examination to push for justice reform at the
national level.
International criminal prosecution after government involvement in
atrocities has traditionally followed an ousting of the implicated regime. 66
It is often said that transitional states have a "window of opportunity" to
come to terms with their past immediately following a period of violence.67
In Kenya, however, the "window of opportunity" never materialized after
the post-election violence. The political and economic elite that financed
much of the post-election violence is still operating and has significant
influence over the justice system. 68
That lack of political transition has led many NGOs to advocate for the
election of new political leaders instead of for reform of the national
criminal justice system.69 These NGOs believe that the only way to spur
real reform is to first oust the current leaders. Not even the NGOs working
on justice reform at some level appeared to be pushing for immediate
reforms or for the installment of domestic transitional justice mechanisms
to deal with the post-election violence, because they do not believe that the
Kenyan authorities are susceptible to such pressure. Instead, they were
working toward long-term objectives, with an eye toward pushing for
implementation of reforms after, as they stated, "the government's thinking
has evolved."70
Additionally, several of our interviewees claimed that since
governments have historically been elected on reform agendas, the Kenyan
government continuously goes through "cycles" in which it actively
pursues reforms immediately before, during, and immediately after
elections.7 ' Hence, when election time is not fast approaching, the
government stagnates and becomes less interested in implementing
reforms. Politicians will still engage with civil society and "talk the
65. STIGEN, supra note 26, at 474-76.
66. Lipscomb, supra note 29, at 189.
67. Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and
National Prosecutions, A View From Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201, 216 (2000).
68. Godfrey M. Musila, The Accountability Process in Kenya: Context, Themes and Mechanisms,
in THE KENYAN SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTs, 8 JUDICIARY WATCH
REPORT, supra note 46, at 28, 52.
69. Interviews with anonymous org. no. 7, supra note 49; interview with anonymous org.
no. 6, supra note 50.
70. Interview with anonymous org. no. 2, supra note 51.
71. Interview with former Director of Public Prosecutions, supra note 12; interview with
anonymous org. no. 1, supra note 57.
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language of human rights," but they simply defer reforms to the future. 72
The next election in Kenya is in 2012, and during the ICC preliminary
examination, the government was apparently not at a point in the political
cycle where it could be compelled to realize reforms in order to retain its
mandate. This situation compromised the opportunities for NGOs to
leverage the stigma of ICC intervention into reforms of the national
criminal justice system. Many people commented that the government is
an extremely sophisticated and devious collaborator; one person even
described it as "schizophrenic." 73 When an NGO can bring expertise to the
table or when the government wants to appear pro-reformist, it welcomes
involvement and treats NGOs as allies, but when NGOs demand reforms,
the government is ultimately non-responsive. Consequently, many of the
local NGOs have largely stopped pushing for reform, whereas the
international NGOs, who still interact with the state, mainly focus on
capacity-building and training and do not pressure the state to implement
reforms to ensure accountability for the post-election violence.
"Legitimacy" and "stigma" could serve as an analytical framework to
understand how NGOs can seek constructive ways of taking advantage of
an ICC preliminary examination to catalyze domestic prosecutions and
push for institutional reform. However, the extent to which an NGO
actually chooses to do so depends on the NGO's particular advocacy
agenda. Thus, although the legitimacy and stigma frameworks are useful
insofar as they point to two powerful potential incentives for NGOs to use
the ICC as an aid when advocating for domestic accountability, they fall
short in trying to explain why NGOs in Kenya have chosen to advocate for
international over national justice.
C. The "Perverse Incentive": NGOs and the Lack of National Criminal
Justice System Reform in Kenya
Our research suggests that the lack of direct NGO participation in
criminal justice system reform in Kenya today is at least partially related to
the way in which NGOs have tailored their agenda in anticipation of the
government's response. First, several NGOs expressed that they were
reluctant to advocate for reform until after the ICC actually intervened
because they feared that improvements of the criminal justice system or
installment of transitional justice mechanisms would avert ICC intervention
and create impunity for the main perpetrators. 74 Second, the NGOs that
were in fact working indirectly on criminal justice system reform were
convinced that the state was currently not open to such reform; they were
72. Interview with anonymous org. no.1, supra note 57.
73. Interview with anonymous org. no. 3, supra note 52.
74. Interview with anonymous org. no. 1, supra note 57; interview with anonymous org.
no. 5, supra note 56; interview with anonymous org. no. 6, supra note 50; interview with
anonymous org. no. 7, supra note 49.
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thus working primarily toward long-term goals, making it impossible to
take advantage of the temporary attention that the preliminary examination
provided to push for immediate reform.75
Since the ICC can only assume jurisdiction when a State Party has
either not taken any action to investigate and prosecute, or has proven
unwilling or unable to do so,76 preliminary examinations might create a
"perverse incentive" for NGOs: should they focus their advocacy on ICC
intervention, claiming that the State is unwilling or, due to deficiencies in
the criminal justice system, unable to prosecute perpetrators? Or should
they advocate for domestic capacity building to increase the functioning of
the domestic legal system in line with the idea of positive complementarity?
This dilemma creates a situation where NGOs might prefer not to advocate
for reform on the national level because it could preclude ICC intervention.
For example, one NGO representative recognized that he could use his
informal contacts with the government to educate and inform members of
Parliament and the executive branch about the probability of ICC
intervention and how it might be avoided. When asked why he has not
utilized this channel, he responded with surprise: "And warn them?"
Instead of pushing for domestic reforms, this NGO representative preferred
to keep the government in the dark so that the ICC would in fact move
forward and intervene in Kenya.77
This perverse incentive is the product of a belief among NGOs and the
Kenyan public in general that the ICC can satisfy goals that a domestic
justice mechanism cannot.78 In the case of Kenya, the ICC is perceived to
serve two sets of objectives that national mechanisms cannot. The first set
of objectives is related to both concrete and symbolic consequences that are
more likely to be expected from ICC intervention than from national justice
mechanisms. These include setting a breaking point between an old and a
new regime, ousting some of the current political leaders, engendering
75. Interview with anonymous org. no. 3, supra note 52; interview with anonymous
organization no. 2, supra note 51.
76. It should be noted that the Rome Statute does not affirmatively address the allocation
of the burden of proof for establishing admissibility issues. However, according to the ICC
Statute, the Prosecutor must conclude that there is reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation before requesting authorization to proceed from the Pre-trial Chamber. Statute
of the International Criminal Court, art. 15(3), July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. The Rules
provide that admissibility is a relevant factor in the "reasonable basis" determination. See id.
arts. 53(l) (b), 17. If this were not the case, the Prosecutor could violate the sovereignty of a
country by commencing an investigation on the basis of article 15 against a national of a State
Party that was willing and able to do so. For further discussion, see, e.g., Megan A. Fairlie,
Establishing Admissibility at the International Criminal Court: Does the Buck Stop with the
Prosecutor, Full Stop?, 39 INT'L L. 817, 819-820 (2005) (noting that the Rome Statute does not
place the burden of proof with regard to admissibility on the Prosecutor or any other specific
party and arguing for specific solutions to overcome this uncertainty); Mohammed M. El
Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal
Law, 23 MICH. j. INT'L L. 869, 899 (20U2) (arguing that Article 17 provides that the Prosecutor
has a burden of proof with regard to admissibility/complementarity determinations).
77. Interview with anonymous org. no. 1, supra note 57.
78. Brian Concannon, Jr., supra note 67, at 240.
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wide international visibility, promoting transparency, and deterring future
violence. The second set of objectives is composed of broader rule of law
strengthening and social development expectations implicitly created by
ICC intervention. These include ending impunity, introducing a new
system of public accountability, effecting poverty relief, development, and
peace, and restructuring the Kenyan state, all of which are unlikely to result
from any other justice mechanism. We explore both sets of objectives in
order to facilitate the understanding of why NGOs choose to advocate for
international justice rather than domestic accountability and national
criminal justice system reform.
D. Concrete and Symbolic Consequences of ICC Intervention
The general sentiment about ICC intervention is that it will send
Kenyan political leaders an important symbolic message about
accountability. This perception is reflected in the Kenyan reaction to
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo talking about Kenya in the international
media. The notion is that, if the ICC prosecutes the main political leaders of
the country, the whole world will know about it, and therefore politicians
will realize that they cannot get away with orchestrating mass violence to
stay in power. Several NGOs view ICC intervention as a form of catharsis.
They suggest that the symbolic act of simply trying a few perpetrators will
"eradicate political unwillingness" and "open up opportunities" for
installment of additional domestic accountability procedures, such as a
Special Tribunal. 79
Many of the NGO representatives we interviewed also mentioned that,
while ICC proceedings would be transparent and legitimate, any type of
national procedure, be it ordinary or transitional, would be corrupt and
politicized. Under a cost-benefit analysis, they would rather have the ICC
indict two or three people than have a Special Tribunal indict many more
under a corrupt system.80 The underlying presupposition of this type of
calculation is a very deep level of distrust of the current government.
In this sense, NGO representatives believe that the concrete results of
ICC intervention (in terms of transparency and top-level accountability)
and its symbolic effects (the cathartic moment of public and international
recognition that the post-election violence was unacceptable), constitute the
only means for deterring a repetition of massive violence around the 2012
elections.
79. Interview with anonymous org. no. 5, supra note 56; interview with anonymous org.




Bjork and Goebertus: Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society and the ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
E. Rule of Law and Development Expectations About ICC
Intervention
A second set of objectives that the ICC is expected to achieve - and that
the national criminal justice system and transitional justice mechanisms
apparently cannot fulfill - is related to broader rule of law strengthening
and development goals.
Several NGOs hope that ICC intervention can end the culture of
impunity and create a system of accountability in Kenya. Although they
recognize that the ICC would not participate directly in reforming the
national criminal justice system, they believe that ICC intervention will
spark these processes.81
Other organizations, particularly grassroots organizational leaders,
advocate ICC intervention as a "window of opportunity" to restructure the
state, reduce poverty, and produce development and stability. 82 Although
many NGO representatives we encountered were working on countering
these expectations, the reality is that ordinary citizens have in part come to
prefer the ICC to domestic justice mechanisms because they associate
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo - whose face can be seen depicted on public
transportation buses in Nairobi - with the opportunity for a better life. In
our visit to Huruma, locals referred to lack of water, lack of food, lack of
housing, corruption in the political class, and lack of political accountability
as the type of problems they expected the ICC to solve.
Thus, expectations about the ICC are advanced as arguments for why
ICC intervention is preferable to domestic justice. Those who expect the
ICC to satisfy goals that the national criminal justice system cannot stress
the lack of will and limited capacity of the justice system rather than
advocating for reforms. Inevitably, this situation poses a paradox for
NGOs: if they increase the capacity of the national criminal justice system to
try perpetrators of the post-election violence, they can no longer build a
case at the ICC that the State is unwilling or incapable of doing so. In
practice, this means that NGOs are unlikely to contribute to positive
complementarity during preliminary examinations.
In Kenya, the "perverse incentives" created by the preference for
international over domestic justice and the lack of trust in the current
government discourage the formation of a civil society movement for
national criminal justice system reform in Kenya.
81. Interview with anonymous org. no. 1, supra note 57; interview with anonymous org.
no. 2, supra note 51; interview with anonymous org. no. 3, supra note 52; interview with
anonymous org. no. 5, supra note 56; interview with anonymous org. no. 7, supra note 8.
82. Interview with anonymous org. no. 6, supra note 50; interview with anonymous org.
no. 7, supra note 8.
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As previously noted, one of the key objectives of the current ICC
Prosecutor's understanding of complementarity is to improve the
performance of States in fulfilling their obligation to investigate and
prosecute the crimes addressed by the Rome Statute.83 In Kenya, we did
not see the effects of a successful preliminary examination. Since state
authorities remained inactive in terms of prosecuting perpetrators of the
post-election violence, the Prosecutor asked the ICC Trial Chamber for
authorization to open a formal investigation, indicating that he did not see
any prospect of succeeding with his aspirations to encourage national
prosecutions.
However, as we have shown, the potential impact of ICC preliminary
examinations in terms of encouraging positive complementarity amounts to
more than institutional capacity building. In Kenya, the ICC might still be
able to empower civil society and contribute to rule of law strengthening.
Several NGOs in Kenya were indeed taking advantage of the ICC
preliminary examination to further their objectives, which, although not
directly related to national criminal justice system reform, contributed
indirectly to strengthening the rule of law. NGOs have taken advantage of
the legitimacy afforded by the ICC to work with communities, creating
awareness about the importance of choosing better leaders and reducing
ethnic divisiveness.
In particular, NGOs with bottom-up approaches, dedicated to spurring
community demand for accountability, have been successful in leveraging
ICC attention. Some work with communities toward critical reasoning that
can contribute to the election of new leaders on the basis of principles and
interests rather than ethnic group.84  This indirectly contributes to
strengthening the rule of law, as it sets the basis for democratic political
renovation of leadership, opening the way for a new generation of
politicians who believe in accountability and transparency and can lead
future justice reform. Other NGOs work with communities to help them
create and accept a collective narrative around the fact that the post-election
violence implicated perpetrators and victims of all ethnicities in Kenya, and
therefore, that those held responsible will (and must) come from all
ethnicities.85 This also contributes to strengthening the rule of law as it
prepares society to accept judicial decisions - and therefore increases
compliance - regardless of the ethnicity of those prosecuted. Yet other
NGOs are dedicated to self-sustaining programs for communities, under
the premise that peace building and reconciliation must come hand in hand
with a development program. 86 These activities contribute to strengthening
83. POLICY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 5; KLEFFNER, supra note 26, at 216.
84. Interview with anonymous org. no. 6, supra note 50.
85. Interview with anonymous org. no. 7, supra note 49.
86. Interview with anonymous org. no. 4, supra note 54.
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the rule of law as they push communities up from a level where some
people would agree to become "mercenaries" for a few shillings, to a
situation in which they can pause and exercise their rights and duties as
citizens.
In this sense, the ICC has contributed to a process in which NGOs are
working to empower communities in their quest to demand accountability,
elect their own representatives, and gain a stake in the system. This may
not be what the Prosecutor intended when he said that the ICC shall
"encourage and facilitate States to carry out their primary responsibility of
investigating and prosecuting crimes,"87 but it can certainly contribute to
strengthening the rule of law over the long term. Thus, while we found
that NGOs did not take advantage of the ICC preliminary examination to
advocate for criminal justice reform, this does not mean that they have not
taken any advantage of the ICC preliminary examination to forward their
agendas.
If one should draw any general conclusion from the Kenyan case, it
must be that NGOs can indeed gain leverage from the ICC, but, as obvious
as it may sound, only to advance the objectives on their own agenda. For
the NGOs we interviewed in Kenya, domestic criminal justice system
reform does not seem to be a priority at the moment. This appears to be
due in part to present political constraints, and in part to the "perverse
incentives" described above. When judicial reform is not what NGOs
desire because they do not believe the system will be strong enough to
prosecute the main perpetrators, the ICC is precluded from realizing the
Prosecutor's stated objective of encouraging domestic prosecutions. Thus,
the extent to which ICC preliminary examinations might actually "trigger"
domestic prosecution of international crimes depends partly on whether
NGOs will seek new sources of legitimacy and stigma from the ICC and
attempt to contribute more directly to domestic institutional strengthening.
The discussion about the "perverse incentives" explains why NGOs in
Kenya prefer demonstrating the incapability and unwillingness of the
Kenyan authorities, rather than participating directly in criminal justice
system reform. Hence, one important question to be addressed within the
context of advancing positive complementarity is what can be done to
incentivize NGOs to adopt domestic accountability as part of their agendas.
That, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.
At this point, what can be concluded is that the ICC preliminary
examination, through its capacity to confer extended legitimacy and stigma,
could serve to support a more direct participation in domestic justice
reforms, at least in countries where the level of distrust between NGOs and
the State is not as deep as in Kenya. For example, instead of merely
advocating against the State as a whole and for the election of new leaders,
NGOs could take advantage of the rule of law strengthening discourse of
87. POLICY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 5.
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the ICC, and use it to influence the domestic public agenda. This is not
only the objective of the current ICC Prosecutor but also the underlying
meaning of an international criminal system based on the principle of
complementarity.
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